In
every language there are words like tree and run and red which seem to
have an obvious relation to objects and events and descriptions of
things in the world around us. Children learning their native language
first learn words in association with observable items and situations
and events. This simple fact can give rise to an overly simple idea
about what ‘meaning’ is. We are likely to think that a language consists
of a large number of words and each of these words has a direct
correlation with something outside of language, which is its meaning.
And since, if we communicate with one another through language, it must
be that we all have the same ‘idea’ or ‘concept’ associated with each
word.
The
best known elaboration of this view was made by Ogden and Richards
(1923), who developed a mentalistic theory about meaning, an attempt to
explain meaning in terms of what is in people’s minds. Their explanation
centers around this scheme:
Ogden
and Richards called the bond between word and concept an ‘association,’
the bond between concept and object ‘reference,’ and the bond between
object and word ‘meaning.’
When
we hear or read a word, we often form a mental picture of what the word
represents, and so we are apt to equate ‘concept’ with a mental
picture. To be sure, it is easier to form a mental picture for some
words—DOOR and DOG, for example—than for others such as ORDINARY or
PROBLEM or PRETEND. But the idea of a mental picture is misleading. What
mental image do you form for DOOR? A revolving door? A folding door? A
sliding door, moving horizontally? An overhead door which moves
vertically? A door turning on hinges? Is it in a wall, or on a cabinet,
or part of a car? Is your image associated with DOG that of a St Bernard
or a Pekingese, a mongrel or an Irish Setter? You can picture all of
these in sequence but not simultaneously. Clearly the meaning of door or
dog is more than what is included in a single image, and your knowledge
of these words is much more than the ability to relate them to single
objects. You can use these words successfully in a large number of
situations because you have the knowledge that makes this possible.
Just
as we distinguished between ‘utterance’ and ‘sentence,’ we need to draw
a distinction betweeen reference and denotation. Reference is the
relation between a language expression such as this door, both doors,
the dog, another dog and whatever the expression pertains to in a
particular situation of language use, including what a speaker may
imagine. Denotation is the potential of a word like door or dog to enter
into such language expressions. Reference is the way speakers and
hearers use an expression successfully; denotation is the knowledge they
have that makes their use successful.
The
trouble with a mentalistic theory of meaning is, first, that not all
words can be associated with mental images and some words have a range
of meaning greater than any single association. The bigger problem with a
mentalistic theory is that we have no access to other people’s minds.
How can we ever know that we all have the same mental images? If
semantics is a science, it cannot operate scientifically by starting
with things that are not observable and not comparable.
Furthermore,
words are not the only semantic units. Meanings are expressed by units
that may be maller than words —morphemes— and meanings are expressed in
units —sentences— that are larger than words. The sentences The dog bit a
man and The man bit a dog, to use a trite example, contain the same
words but they don’t express the same meanings.
Furthermore,
meaning is more than denotation. People not only talk and write to
describe things and events and characteristics; they also express their
opinions, favorable and unfavorable. Language furnishes the means for
expressing a wide range of attitudes; this aspect of meaning is called
connotation. Another aspect is sense relations: the meaning of any
expression varies with context, what other expressions it occurs with
and what expressions it contrasts with.
